ABSTRACT Wireless sensors have been helpful and popular for gathering information, in particular in harsh environments. Due to the limit of computation power and energy, compressive sensing has attracted considerable attention in achieving simultaneous sensing and compression of data on the sensor/encoder side with cheap cost. Nevertheless, along with the increase of the data size, the computation overhead for decoding becomes unaffordable on the user/decoder side. To overcome this problem, by taking advantage of resourceful cloud, it is helpful to leverage the overhead. In this paper, we propose a cloud-assisted compressive sensing-based data gathering system with security assurance. Our system, involving three parties of sensor, cloud, and user, possesses several advantages. First, in terms of security, for any two data that are sparse in certain transformed domain, their corresponding ciphertexts are indistinguishable on the cloud side. Second, to avoid the communication bottleneck between the user and cloud, the sensor can encrypt data individually such that, once the cloud receives encrypted data from sensor, it can immediately carry out its task without requesting any information from the user. Third, we show that, even though the cloud knows the permuted support information of data, the security never is sacrificed. Meanwhile, the compression rate can be reduced further. Theoretical and empirical results demonstrate that our system is cost effective and privacy guaranteed and that it possesses acceptable reconstruction quality.
of reconstructing a high-dimensional original signal from its corresponding low-dimensional measurement vector, as this procedure is usually time-consuming.
To meet the requirement of preserving secrecy, the sensing matrix is considered as a key in [10] , where perfect secrecy defined by Shannon [11] is not achievable but computational secrecy can be guaranteed. Such a framework only considers two participants, sensor and user. Considering the fact that the decoding process in CS is time-consuming, the overhead may not be acceptable, especially for large-scale data.
B. RELATED WORK
We classify the existing works for CS-based data gathering based on two characteristics: i) with or without cloud assistance and ii) know or do not know input signals on the sensor. Specifically, with cloud assistance, the task with significant overhead on the decoder side will be carried out by a cloud instead of a user. Along with the setting of cloud-assistance, an accompanying challenge is that a sensing matrix no longer is considered as a key; otherwise, the cloud cannot carry out decoding. In addition, CS requires that the input signal be unknown on the encoder because compressing and sensing are done simultaneously. On the contrary, if the input signal is known, it means the sampling rate on the encoder cannot break out Nyquist rate.
1) KNOW INPUT SIGNAL BUT WITHOUT CLOUD ASSISTANCE
In the literature, to enhance the security and privacy, Qi et al. [12] proposed a hybrid system using 8-bit integer chaotic block encryption and message authentication codes (MACs)-based hashing. Qi et al. [13] used pseudo-random permutation (PRP) and symmetric encryption to encrypt measurements. Similarly, Xie et al. [14] exploited homomorphic encryption to encrypt input signals such that the privacy is preserved. The aforementioned methods, however, did not consider cloud assistance and required to know the input signals. Hu et al. [15] proposed two statistical inference attacks for non-cloud assisted systems such that the sensing matrix, treated as the key, may be estimated. Thus, traditional CS-based methods may suffer from information leakage under these attacks.
2) DO NOT KNOW INPUT SIGNAL BUT WITH CLOUD ASSISTANCE
Wang et al. [16] , [17] first proposed a cloud-assisted system based on CS. Their key idea is that the original data are one-to-one mapped into random data, which are recovered on the cloud by using linear programming (LP). Then, the user can reconstruct data efficiently by inverse mapping. The authors claimed that any two ciphertexts are indistinguishable in terms of statistical distance. On the contrary, Hung et al. [18] did not use the encryption scheme as in [16] and [17] . Thus, they returned to use convex programming on the cloud because the length of reconstructed signals by linear programming is twice longer than that by convex programming, leading to more storage cost. In addition, their encryption aims to permute the sparse data. Zhang et al. [19] extended this framework for multiple input signals and proposed using Arnold Transform to scramble the positions of multiple input signals. Xue et al. [20] also aims to a cloudassisted system, where the ciphertext still includes statistical information such that the user can calculate average, sum, and standard deviation of the plaintext without decryption. However, from the viewpoint of security, statistical information is easily leaked to the attacker. To prevent the cloud from reconstructing the plaintext, the user also must pay communication cost for sending an encrypted matrix to the cloud. The aforementioned methods do not assume to know the input signals.
3) KNOW INPUT SIGNAL WITH CLOUD ASSISTANCE
Zhang et al. [21] assumed that the data to be sensed are known to the sensor for achieving higher security. They also proposed another work [22] considering two kinds of clouds, private cloud and public cloud. Each image is partitioned into a small set of sensitive data and a large set of insensitive data, which are securely stored in the private cloud and the public cloud, respectively. The process of partition, however, involves the knowledge of input signal.
C. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, our system follows a similar framework to [17] with sensor, cloud, and user. The prerequisite is that data are unknown for any participants and possess sparsity in a certain domain. To reduce the cost on the sensor side, we first use CS to simultaneously sense, encrypt, and compress data before sending the compressed and encrypted data to the cloud for signal recovery. Then, the reconstructed but still encrypted data is stored on the cloud and sent to user for decryption when the user issues a query. Among them, the cloud is responsible for the time-consuming signal recovery task.
We summarize the contributions of our system and compare it with [17] as follows.
(1) The secure mechanism in Wang et al. ' s system requires transmitting extra information from the user to the cloud once the cloud wants to reconstruct encrypted data. On the contrary, in our system, when the cloud receives the data from the sensor, the cloud can immediately start to reconstruct and store the data. No communication cost for extra information is required between the user and cloud. In other words, when the user issues a query, it only needs to transmit the query message and the cloud can immediately return the reconstructed data without spending any waiting time for reconstruction, whereas [17] does. (2) We present a new concept of sparsity-based data encryption. The encryption scheme is designed to add another sparse random data to the original data for hiding information on the sensor side. When data are sparse, our system achieves security in that, given any two plaintexts, their corresponding ciphertexts are VOLUME 6, 2018 indistinguishable in terms of statistical distance. We further study how sparse is enough for our system. (3) In (2), the encrypted data become more non-sparse (corresponding to increase of non-zero entries) than its original counterpart. In the context of CS, the reconstruction quality, in general, degrades along with the increase of non-zero entries in the encrypted data. To overcome this problem, we show that 1 -minimization with the information of support set, which is transmitted from the sensor to the cloud, can maintain the reconstruction quality without losing security.
Since the cardinality of support set is related to the sparsity that is less than the number of measurements, this encryption scheme possesses low computation, storage, and communication costs on the sensor side.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THIS PAPER
After introducing the background of the cloud-assisted compressive sensing-based data gathering problem, the preliminary is described in Sec. II to make this paper selfcontained. In Sec. III, the model formulation, including system model, threat mode, and overview of the proposed compressed sensing with encryption in communication (CSEiC) system, is described. Then, we specifically describe CSEiC, including performance and security analyses, in Sec. IV. Finally, simulation results are given in Sec. V to verify our method. In Appendix, we present an attack and formally prove that Wang et al.'s method [17] is not as secure as they claimed.
II. PRELIMINARY
Compressive sensing [23] includes two components: encoder and decoder. On the encoder side, given a K -sparse signal x ∈ R N (having K non-zero entries), the corresponding measurement vector can be obtained via sensing matrix A ∈ R M ×N as y = Ax with K ≤ M < N . If the encoding phase is contaminated by noise, namely y = Ax + e, with e ∈ R M being Gaussian random noise, 1 -minimization [23] - [25] is an efficient tool to reconstruct x on the decoder side:
where ≥ 0 is often set to e 2 .
Restricted isometric property (RIP), involving a sufficient condition of sparse signal recovery in the context of CS, is the base of our proofs in this paper and is described as follows.
Lemma 1 (RIP): Let A ∈ R M ×N . Suppose that there exists a constant δ |I | < 1 such that, for any x ∈ R |I | and any I ⊂ = {1, 2, .., N },
holds, where A I is a matrix formed by columns of A with indices belonging to I . The matrix A is said to satisfy the |I |-restricted isometry property with restricted isometry constant (RIC) δ |I | .
Lemma 2 [24] : If the sensing matrix A satisfies the RIP of both orders K 1 and
Lemma 3 (Consequences of RIP [26] ):
holds for any x. For example, when δ 2K ≤ 0.414 [26] , the decoder achieves perfect recovery withx = x. In addition, a random matrix is known to satisfy δ dK < t with high probability provided one chooses M = O dK t 2 log N K [27] , where d and t are parameters relevant to M in the context of compressive sensing. For example, if the sufficient condition of perfect recovery is δ 2K ≤ 0.414, it means that d = 2 and t = 0.414.
III. MODEL FORMALIZATION
In this section, before introducing the proposed CSEiC system, we first define the system model and the threat model.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
We introduce the model of our system, called compressed sensing with encryption in communication (CSEiC), with three parties: sensor S, cloud C, and user U. We keep using the notations x, A, and y as the original data, sensing matrix, and measurement vector, respectively, as in the previous sections. In our system, which is depicted in Fig. 1 , the sensing matrix A is public and will be used by S and C. First, S needs to do compression, sensing, and encryption using a one-time secret key sk and A, then sends encrypted measurement y (ciphertext of y) to C. After receiving y , C will use y and A to solve an 1 -minimization problem to obtain and store encrypted dataẑ, which is a ciphertext of reconstructed signal z and will be sent to U if U issues a query. Upon receivingẑ, U can decryptẑ using sk to obtain the recovered data z. Since the goal of our system is to guarantee the security of outsourcing computations in C, the input and output of the optimization problem are encrypted for protection purposes. The optimization problem ( 1 -minimization) is public, which means the computation is known to each party.
We take the healthcare system mentioned in [17] as a real example. The sensor accounts for collecting various raw data about healthcare. To lower the computation overheads with respect to the sensed data, the sensor in our system will send compressed and encrypted data samples to the cloud with privacy preserved. Cloud is responsible for providing data retrieval for users. Here the user might be a healthcare workstation operated by a physician in a hospital.
B. THREAT MODEL
As mentioned, our goal is to guarantee the security of input and output in the system. In this paper, we only assume that only C is adversary and that it is semi-honest, where it will do the computation honestly but be curious about the input and output. The C can only know information from A,ẑ, and y . The adversary considered in this paper is a kind of ciphertextonly attack.
C. OVERVIEWS OF CSEIC SYSTEM
CSEiC is composed of four algorithms: Keygen, ECS, ERecovery, and DCS. The formal definition of CSEiC is as follows.
Definition 1: With a parameter pp depending on κ and a sensing matrix A depending on pp, which are public, CSEiC is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms, denoted by CSEiC={Keygen, ECS, ERecovery, DCS}.
• (sk) ← Keygen(1 κ , pp): takes as input of security parameter κ and pp, and outputs a secret key sk for encryption on the sensor and user sides.
• (y ) ← ECS(A, pp, sk, x): takes A, pp, and sk to sense, compress, and encrypt the original signal x, and outputs a ciphertext y .
• (ẑ) = ERecovery(A, y ): takes A to recover/decompress the data y sent out from the sensor, and outputs a ciphertextẑ.
• (z) = DCS(pp, sk,ẑ): takes pp and sk to decryptẑ, and outputs a reconstructed signal z. There are two main characteristics of CSEiC. Free-Error Correctness: For original data x, if ERecovery (A, y ) outputs decryptable ciphertextẑ, then we have
Security: CSEC is κ-secure if, for any two K -sparse data x 0 and x 1 , there exists a negligible function negl such that
where SD( 0 , 1 ) measures the statistical distance between two tasks, 0 and 1 , 1
Since both pp and A are fixed, they can be used in multiple different tasks. We remark that A does not need to change at all times. This property reduces the communication costs of S and U, and leads to better efficiency than [17] .
In our system, the inherent security of CSEiC enables a powerful guarantee in that the PPT adversary distinguishes both tasks, 0 and 1 , with probability less than negl(κ) for any two K -sparse signals. Thus, (y , A,ẑ) observed by C does not leak any information of x.
IV. THE CSEIC SYSTEM
In this section, we first introduce the construction of CSEiC in IV-A. Then, we analyze the correctness and security of CSEiC in IV-B. Finally, we compare the cost of CSEiC with that of [17] .
Remarks, notations, and assumptions:
• PM is a distribution of random permutation matrix.
• Original signal x is in an analog form on the sensor side, but is digital on the user side.
• x is supposed to be K -sparse with K ≤ M ≤ N to meet the requirements in CS and
•
Given a vector u, we denote u[i] as i-th entry of u. abs(·)
denotes an element-wise absolute function.
• N = poly(κ), M = poly(κ), and K = poly(κ).
• H $ ← D R×C denotes each entry of H is an i.i.d. sample from D, and H is an R × C matrix.
• N(0, σ 2 ) denotes a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ 2 .
A. CONSTRUCTION OF CSEIC
In this section, we describe the detailed construction of CSEiC. The formal descriptions are shown in Algorithms 1, 2, 3, and 4. Before getting into detail, we will first summarize our encryption idea. Suppose y = APx, where the permutation matrix P is used to protect the positions of non-zero entries of x against ciphertext-only attack (CoA), as in [18] , if we consider Px to be a ciphertext. Furthermore, the real positions are unknown, meaning attackers cannot reconstruct the plaintext x perfectly. Px, however, still leaks information about the values of x. To overcome this problem, an intuitive way is to design P as a generalized permutation matrix, where each diagonal entry is drawn from a standard normal distribution. For this, let (i, j) be a pair, where i/j denotes the index after/before permutation. Then, we have
Note that Px, however, still is not statistically independent of x. Actually, the system [17] has the same security breach with the aforementioned method, which will be proved formally in Appendix. In the following, we present another solution to address this problem.
Inspired by the facts that conventional encryption adds a random vector to Px to hide the values of Px and that random projection in compressive sensing is linear, we first construct a random vector u , where each entry is drawn
Let be a diagonal matrix, where the diagonal entry is either 0 or 1, depending on the support set S, and let u = P −1 u . Although Px is unknown, we have y = APx. Thus, instead of directly computing Px − u , we subtract y by A u to generate y , which is sent to the cloud, for the goal of protecting x as:
where
Note that this ''minus'' computation in (3) helps us hide the information of non-zero entries in x thanks to x . Intuitively, if the outputẑ of ERecovery is equal to x , then DCS outputs z = x by z = P −1 ẑ + Pu . The analysis will be presented in the next subsection.
With this idea, the four algorithms are described as follows.
• Keygen (Algorithm 1): It uses M , N , and pp to create a one-time vector u and one-time permutation matrix P in order to avoid the security breach, where the attacker accumulates enough plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts to estimate u and P via regression.
• ECS (Algorithm 2): The original measurement vector y without encryption is sensed via y = APx. We detect the support S of Px via collecting the indices of the first 2K largest entries of abs(A T y). Finally, the ciphertext is transmitted, according to (3) , to cloud as:
• ERecovery (Algorithm 3): It uses y and A to solve an 1 -minimization problem and obtain ciphertextẑ.
• DCS (Algorithm 4): It uses u and P to decryptẑ as z. It should be noted that we generate u and P randomly for the encryption each time. In other words, u and P can be used as one-time key. In practice, we always need plenty of secret keys to encrypt signals, where the secret keys must be stored in advance on both the sender and user sides. Storing these keys seems to consume a lot of storage, where such a situation also happens in Wang et al.'s method. In fact, we can avoid the excessive use of storage by classical methods in that a master secret key is pre-shared to generate plenty of u and P on both the sender and user sides by means of pseudorandom function, which is one of well-studied cryptographic primitives [28] in achieving computational security.
Algorithm 1 Keygen
Input: 1 κ , pp.
Output: sk = (u , P).
Algorithm 2 ECS
Input: A, pp, sk, x.
3) Sensing y = APx; 4) r = abs(A T y); 5) Set S as a set of collecting indices of the first 2K largest entries of r;
Output: y .
Algorithm 3 ERecovery
Input: A, y .
1) Obtainẑ by solving the following problem:
arg min
Output:ẑ.
Algorithm 4 DCS
Input: pp, sk,ẑ.
1)
Parse sk = (u , P); 2) Set S as a set of collecting indices of the first 2K largest entries of abs(ẑ);
Output: z.
B. ANALYSIS 1) FREE-ERROR CORRECTNESS
In this section, we show that, ifẑ = x , P is invertible and both S's on the sensor and the cloud are the same, then z = x, which will achieve free-error correctness. Since P is a permutation matrix, it will be invertible.
To show the exact recoveryẑ = x on the cloud, if x is K -sparse and M = O K log N K due to perfect recovery of CS, then the output of decoder is x . Since x = Px − Pu, x is K -sparse, and the diagonal entries of only have 2K non-zero entries, x must be less than or equal to 3K . Thus,
According to the algorithm,ẑ is the signal x added with a 2K -sparse random vector, whose the support set S on the sensor is decided by finding the first 2K largest entries of abs(A T y). When S includes the real support set of x (discussed in Theorem 2 in the next section), it means that the support set ofẑ must be equal to S on the sensor. Thus, by finding the first 2K largest entries of abs(ẑ), we can ensure that both S's on the sensor and the user are the same. Consequently, free-error correctness holds.
2) SECURITY
Here, we discuss the security of our system. First, we show that distinguishing any two tasks, 0 , and 1 , is equivalent to distinguishing the statistical distance between corresponding ciphertext,ẑ 0 andẑ 1 . We can derive:
The second equality is based on y b = Aẑ b for b ∈ {0, 1}. The inequality is derived because Aẑ b is a function ofẑ b for b ∈ {0, 1} and SD(f (X ), f (Y )) ≤ SD(X , Y ) for any random variable X and Y with a deterministic function f . The last equality follows from the fact that A is independent ofẑ b and A is identical in two tasks.
As described in Sec. IV-B.1),ẑ = x is ensured due to freeerror correctness. By (4), we derive thatẑ = Px − Pu, which is further considered as a random vector with:
Ideally, if {i| (Px) [i] = 0} ⊂ S, namely perfect support detection of Px, then (6) is further reduced tô
Based on these observations, we show the statistical distance betweenẑ 0 andẑ 1 is bounded by a negligible function as follows. Theorem 1: Suppose 0 and 1 are any two tasks and the corresponding original signals x 0 and x 1 are K -sparse. If perfect support detection with |S| = cK holds, then
as two multivariate random variables, where, for all non-zero entries, the positions are distributed uniformly over [1, N ] and the values follow a uniform distribution with ranges different from those in (7). Sinceẑ b [i] = 0 for all i ∈ S b with probability 0, we make an assumption that the range of all uniform random variables does not contain zero. Namely,
for all i ∈ S b . In other words, the sparsity ofẑ b is cK , which simplifies our subsequent proof. This assumption does not change statistical distance, defined as:
where fˆz 0 and fˆz 1 are probability density functions (p. 
In addition, we can derive:
In (10), the first equality relies on the conditional probability
and Pr sp(ẑ 0 ) = ω j = 1/ N cK for any j. The second equality holds because, if sp(v) = ω j for v ∈ i and i = j, then
Given ω i for any i, the number of permutations of cK nonzero entries is cK !. Let π i 1 , . . . , π i cK ! be all possible orders and let o ω i (ẑ) output the order ofẑ. Then,
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Furthermore, we can derive:
According to (9) , (10), (11), and (12), we finally induce:
We complete this proof. Following So far, if {i| (Px) [i] = 0} ⊂ S (Namely, perfect support detection) holds, the proposed system is secure. Next, we discuss and derive the sufficient condition of perfect support detection of Px. We extend Lemma 3 to the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Let I 1 and I 2 ⊂ be two sets with
holds for any x, where U is the set collecting indices of the first γ largest entries of abs(x) and V = I 2 \ U . Proof: We start from the case |I 1 ∩ I 2 | = c and |U | = c with c ≤ γ . Let U and V satisfy I 1 ∩ I 2 = U with |U | ≤ c and V = I 2 \ U . Then, we have: 
Proof: Let A S be the submatrix formed by the columns of A with indices belonging to S, and let a i be i'th column of A. Based on Step 5 in Algorithm 2, S has the following property:
Then, we can derive:
By Lemma 1, we have
On the other hand, when the chosen support includes partially correct indices (i.e., |S ∩ T = U | ≤ γ ), we have
where V = T \ U and the inequality follows from Lemma 4. This inequality contradicts (17) if
We complete this proof. By Theorem 2, letting γ = K − 1, we can induce the following corollary for perfect support detection. , if
From Corollary 1, we know that a random matrix satisfies δ 3K < η 5 with high probability, provided one chooses [27] . Thus, we can achieve security with a larger number of measurements than M = O K log N K , which is required for perfect recovery in CS. To guarantee perfect support detection, we can sense x with more measurements but only transmit M measurements to the cloud without needing extra computation cost on the sensor. For example, if A ∈ R N×N is a circulant matrix or discrete Fourier transform matrix, N measurement can be sensed within O(N log N ) operations via fast Fourier transform (FFT). Nevertheless, this strategy requires the sampling rate on the sensor meet the Nyquist rate. Moreover, the cloud still requires more measurements due to 2K -sparse ciphertext x . We further study how to reduce the number of measurements M in Sec. IV-C.
a: Remarks
In summary, compared with Wang et al.'s system [17] , even though the cloud side (which also can be treated as a semihonest adversary) is allowed to probe information based on the knowledge of A, y , andẑ, our system still is secure. In contrast, Wang et al. tried to hide information of Px in terms of one-to-one linear transformation. In essence, however, solving linear programming is equivalent to reconstructing Px. In other words, the security of Wang et al.'s system, in fact, is not as high as their claim that any of two ciphertexts are indistinguishable in terms of statistical distance. We show that their system can only protect information about the positions of non-zero entries of data under certain attacks, as formally proved in Appendix. Nevertheless, CSEiC encrypts x by actually adding a random vector to itself, as shown in (4), such that the cloud no longer aims at reconstructing Px. This exactly states the main difference between CSEiC and [17] , and why the former possesses higher security.
C. REDUCTION OF MEASUREMENTS
Recall that our method works well, depending on perfect reconstruction of x on the cloud, as discussed in Sec. IV-B. In this section, we discuss how to reduce the number M of measurements under fixed reconstruction quality on the cloud, without losing any security.
Recall that the cloud will obtainẑ = x . Thus, the cloud can obtain the support set S of x . Since the information about S is included in x , it means
Since we have proved that our system is secure without revealingẑ in Theorem 1, if the sensor sends S to the cloud, the proposed method is still secure.
A fascinating thing is that Wang and Yin [29] proposed a CS decoder where, with the help of the support set S, solving weighted 1 -minimization instead of 1 -minimization is effective to improve the performance. Thus, we can change the decoder procedure on the cloud as:
where W is a diagonal matrix with
We will demonstrate in the simulations that this decoder can reduce the number of measurements while maintaining reconstruction quality.
D. EXTENSION TO DATA BEING SPARSE IN TRANSFORMED DOMAIN
Up to now, previous discussions have been based on the assumption that x is exactly K -sparse in the time domain. Nevertheless, most natural data may not be sparse in the time/spatial domain. On the contrary, if x exhibits certain sparsity in a transformed domain such that s = T x, then we can simply modify Step 3 in Algorithm 2 as:
and modify
Step 4 in Algorithm 3 as
Under this circumstance, our system now is considered as encrypting K -sparse vector s by keeping the first K largest coefficients instead of x. In compressive sensing, there exist many studies [30] - [32] , called ''dictionary learning,'' that aim to find to achieve signal sparsity in a transformed domain. In addition to dictionary learning, it is also well-known that transforms like discrete cosine transform (DCT) or discrete wavelet transform (DWT) can sparsely represent signals well and are commonly adopted. Note that the reconstruction quality is related to RIP of A (neither nor A ) because signals are transformed into the corresponding coefficients in the sensor such that the cloud still uses A (not nor A ) for
E. COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY AND COMMUNICATION COST
We mainly focus on the computation and communication cost [34] on the sensor and user sides since the cloud does not necessarily care about energy consumption. On the sensor side, Step 7 of Algorithm 2 dominates the whole cost. Specifically, it requires O(MN ) operations to multiply an N × 1 vector by an M × N sensing matrix A. As mentioned in Sec. IV-B, there are existing works about fast sensing matrix design [35] , [36] such that the cost is reduced to O(N log N ) . If data are sparse in a transformed domain, we require extra computation cost of matrixby-vector multiplications T x in (20) . In the worst case, T x requires O(N 2 ). Nevertheless, transformed domains like discrete cosine transform (DCT) and wavelet transform can be speeded up such that x costs O(N log N ) operations. In addition, the communication cost for y is O(M ). If we want to send S to cloud, it costs extra O(K ). Since K ≤ M , the total cost is still O(M ).
On the user side, the cost is dominated by Step 4 of Algorithm 4. Since P is a permutation matrix, P −1 can be computed in O(N ) operations andẑ + Pu costs O(N ) operations. In addition, if data are sparse in a transformed domain, it requires multiplying a matrix by a vector P −1 ẑ + Pu . The computation cost depends on , as discussed in the last paragraph. Finally, 1 -minimization on the cloud side requires O(N 3 ) operations. 2 Thus, the cloud burdens the main computation cost. Table 1 shows the comparison with [17] , where [ ] represents the computation cost of matrix-by-vector multiplications. Note that only the cloud requires storing the ciphertext for responding the query from user. The ''User bandwidth'' denotes the number of bits sent from the user to the cloud per data x. In contrast, Wang et al.'s system [17] requires that the user upload an M × N decoding matrix to cloud. Also note that, since the measurement vector y of data is, in fact, required for participating in generating the decoding matrix (see Appendix), user cannot upload the decoding matrix to cloud before querying. The result is that Wang et al.'s system must wait for transmission of the decoding matrix once the user delivers a query. In addition, it may be too heavy to be affordable since the user usually is assumed to have upload speed slower than download speed. If user bandwidth is zero, it means that the cloud does not need to wait for the data sent from the user.
As for user computation, Wang et al.'s system requires O(N θ ) with 2 < θ < 3 due to matrix-by-matrix multiplications. Nevertheless, the cost of our system is bounded by O(N ) + [ ], which is faster than Wang et al.'s system.
V. SIMULATIONS
The simulations were conducted in a MATLAB environment with an Intel CPU Q6600 at 3.40 GHz and 4 GB RAM under Microsoft Win7 (32 bits). We used CVX package for implementing 1 -minimization. On the cloud, Wang et al.'s method [17] used linear programming, which has the same performance as 1 -minimization but suffers higher computation cost due to complex constraints for encryption, as described in Appendix. Thus, we simply consider 1 -minimization as the baseline for comparison here.
In our settings, all test images were with size of 640 × 640 (for ''Brain'') or 640 × 640 (for ''Lena''). They were divided into 32 × 32 blocks, where each block was sensed, encrypted, and decrypted independently because the original images are too large to be efficiently dealt with. The sensing matrix A was drawn from i.i.d. normal variables with N 0, 1 M . 2 The computation complexities in CS depend on different sparse recovery algorithms. O(N 3 ) mentioned here is just for Basis Pursuit [25] , [37] .
In addition, considering images are usually not sparse in the time domain, we sparsify all blocks of images by discrete cosine transform (DCT).
Three experiments were conducted. First, we validate the effectiveness of weighted 1 -minimization and support detection. Second, since our method encrypts the plaintext by actually modifying its values such that the reconstruction quality is changed accordingly, we compare the reconstruction quality between the proposed method and the baseline under the same set of parameters, including N , M , and K . Meanwhile, we show the corresponding encrypted images that illustrate the effectiveness of privacy guarantee. Third, we show the computation costs of encryption and decryption on the sensor, cloud, and user sides, respectively. Furthermore, because we require doing the support detection on the sensor side, we need to decide K . Since the natural images are only approximately K -sparse in the DCT domain, we merely set K = It should be noted that Decoder 1 is considered as a baseline to reconstruct K -sparse vectors via 1 -minimization but Decoders 2 and 3 require reconstructing 2K -sparse vectors because of encryption in our system. Fig. 2 shows the successful probabilities of three decoders, respectively. Although Decoder 1 in Fig. 2(a) Fig. 2(c) exhibits comparable performance with Decoder 1. As expected, Decoder 2 gets the worst performance due to 2K sparsity.
Finally, Fig. 2(d) shows the successful probability of perfect support detection with {i| (Px)
The results reveal the number of measurements required for support detection is larger than that of perfect reconstruction in Fig. 2(c) . Since both perfect support detection and perfect reconstruction must succeed in our system, support detection becomes the bottleneck of requiring more measurements. This problem, however, can be overcome by sensing more measurements but only transmitting M measurements, as discussed in Sec. IV-B.
B. VALIDATION FOR REAL IMAGES
In this section, we focus on the reconstruction quality comparison between the baseline and our system. Fig. 3 demonstrates the effectiveness of privacy guarantee for two images with M N = 0.25. Specifically, Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(d) show the original images sampled on the sensor side. Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(e) show the corresponding encrypted images on the cloud side, and Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(f) show the corresponding reconstructed and decrypted image on the user side.
It is interesting and important to note that the top-left areas of Fig. 3(d) have pixels of zero gray-level. Nevertheless, the corresponding encrypted blocks in Fig. 3 (e) still are indistinguishable from other blocks originally with nonzero values. This illustrates that the proposed system actually achieves the security described in Definition 1.
As for reconstruction quality, which is estimated by peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), under a range of measurement rates, experimental results indicate that our system does not obviously degrade the visual quality (less than 0.6dB degradation, compared with the baseline) for different images. More specifically, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 demonstrate the comparison between our system and Wang et al.'s system [17] in terms of visual reconstruction quality. It is concluded that our method exhibits comparable visual results with Wang et al.'s system but benefits from other properties discussed in Sec. IV-E.
On the other hand, since wireless communication usually suffers from additive Gaussian noise, the Step 7 in ECS (Algorithm 2) is modified as:
where e is an additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ n . We verify the proposed algorithm under σ n = 5, 10, 25 and show the results in Figs. 6 
C. EFFICIENCY EVALUATION
In this section, we follow the same comparison found in [17] . Specifically, we compare the computation cost of 1 -minimization without cloud assistance. Thus, the user needs to burden the cost of 1 -minimization. In contrast, our proposed system only needs to consider the sensor cost and user cost because we do not worry about the resourceful cloud. Therefore, we use the criterion ''Asymmetric Speedup,'' [17] by dividing the cost in conventional system by that in our system, to evaluate computational savings. Table 2 shows the results. Our proposed system always achieves around 245× speedup. In fact, it can be expected that, if the block size increases, the speedup becomes higher too. The results confirm that the cloud actually burdens the main overhead more than the other two parties. In addition, two different images, under the same measurement rate, share nearly asymmetric speedup because each block has the same fixed size, implying the need of the same computation cost.
On the contrary, Wang et al.'s system achieves 7× speedup (see [17, 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a cloud-assisted compressive sensing-based data gathering system. We show that ciphertexts on the cloud side are statistically indistinguishable to achieve privacy assurance. Our method is also cost-effective in terms of communication between the user and cloud such that, once the cloud receives the encrypted data from sensor, it can immediately carry out the intended task. We further show that 1 -minimization with the information of support set can maintain the reconstruction quality without breaching security. We provide both theoretical analyses and empirical results to verify our system.
APPENDIX ATTACK ON WANG et al.'s Method
In [17] , the main idea is to replace 1 -minimization for sparse signal recovery with transformed linear programming (LP), resulting in the reconstructed signal (ciphertext) on the cloud side approximating a Gaussian random signal for protection of the corresponding plaintext. Due to the transformation, the length of ciphertext on the cloud becomes 2N instead of N . In addition, the authors assume that the cloud is a semihonest adversary. Here, we present an attack on Wang et al.'s system to prove that they cannot achieve the security they claimed.
First ' s transform scheme is κ-secure if, over the random choice, the secret key sk with the security parameter κ satisfies:
≤ negl(κ), where S denotes the set of all the LP problems and Trans is a query transformation algorithm that takes as input the secret key sk and the original LP problem and outputs the transformed problem Remarks, notations, and assumptions:
• x is supposed to be K -sparse with K < M < N to meet the requirements in CS and
• f is a measurement vector with f = Ax.
• Q ∈ R M ×M is a random invertible matrix.
• 1 ∈ R 2N is a one vector.
• W ∈ R 2N ×2N such that 1 T W = 1 T .
• D ∈ R 2N ×2N is a generalization permutation matrix and has positive non-zero elements.
• r $ ← U(2 κ ) 2N . Second, we describe the protocol of Wang et al.'s system. On the sensor side, the original signal x ∈ R N is sampled via f = Ax andf = Qf is transmitted to cloud. The user also transmits two matricesˆ andD, whereˆ
Note that λ is dependent on f , implying λ must be generated after the user has receivedf from the cloud. This is the reason we claim Wang et al.'s system cannot avoid the delay of recovery in Sec. IV-E because it fails to transmitD in advance.
After receiving the data from both the sensor and user, the cloud can solve linear programming (LP) as:
whereĉ = 1 T W . The solver will return the ciphertext z with x = Wz − r, where ' s system does not meet the security definition they claimed. Since the cloud is a semi-honest adversary, it can use the information owned by itself to explore the information from the ciphertext z. Recall that the cloud hasD, z, andˆ . We propose an attack such that the cloud can obtain Dx by calculatingDz as:
The second equality uses the property x + r = Wz and the fourth equality uses f = x and Dr − λ (f + r) = 0. The result implies that the cloud can know the permuted x .
Under this attack, r is removed. Then, we prove in Theorem 4 that there exists a pair of plaintexts, x 0 and x 1 , such that the corresponding ciphertexts, z 0 and z 1 , are no longer statistically indistinguishable, which violates Theorem 3. Since Wang et al.'s system never explicitly defines D, 3 we assume that all non-zero elements of D are uniformly distributed within the range of [0, 1] .
Theorem 4 (Insecurity of [17] by Our Attack): Let 
In addition, we can also derive:
We skip the detailed derivations in (24) as they are the same as (10) . Given ω i for any i, the number of permutations for K nonzero entries is K !. Let π i 1 , . . . , π i K ! be all possible orders and let o ω i (ẑ) output the order ofẑ. Then, 
According to (23) , (24), (25) , and (26), we finally induce:
We complete this proof. Consequently, since two transformed LP problems are not statistically indistinguishable, the original objective of protecting data by LP fails. In addition, to solve LP, the user needs to transmit extra information to cloud, consuming extra communication cost. The cloud also must wait until the data transmitted from the user have been completely received.
